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How to Mix Legal Systems in a Fruitful Way? Some Remarks on the Development of a
Ius Commune Europaeum through Competition of Legal Rules
Talk held at the Ius Commune Research School seminar Towards a European Private Law by
Competition of Legal Rules, Maastricht November 19th, 1998.
Jan Smits
Maastricht University
I am delighted that I am given the opportunity to talk to you about one of the most interesting
developments in private law of the last decades. It is the Europeanisation of private law, the
emergence of a new ius commune, that is to be considered as one of the most fascinating
tendencies in present day times. And, as is very often the case with fascinating things, one is
able to discuss them in many different ways. One could discuss the desirability of the coming
into being of a new ius commune (as has been done most notably by Pierre Legrand). One
could discuss the economic or social effects if it (as many economists and political philosop-
hers have done). One could even discuss the very idea of Europe itself (of course politicians
and philosophers alike have taken many points of view on what actually is Europe - and now
that we are in this magnificent place at the Vrijthof, allow me to make mention of Milan
Kundera who has said that to him Europe is a place where you can sit in coffee houses all day,
reading, writing and above all discussing things; in that sense our little seminar could also be
characterised as a European venture). And of course, one could also discuss the method of
creating a ius commune.
Today, I am not going to discuss the desirability nor the effect a ius commune
Europaeum. I will, however, discuss methodology. I take the fact that a common European
private law is desired as a starting point and will talk about the way to establish this. I have to
admit that in the past I have sometimes been provocative in my writings, just to be provocati-
ve, just for the sake of discussion. Today however, I will be provocative as well, but not just
for the sake of discussion. I really believe very much in the things I am going to say. Partly, I
have said these things before, but today I will try to take the argument somewhat further. For
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the sake of discussion, I have divided the argument into three different parts, each of them
being equally important for the point I am trying to make. I will begin by presenting to you
my theory as such on the method by which the ius commune should come about. Then, I will
discuss the benefits of this method and finally some of its disadvantages, that - not surprisingly
to you - will turn out to be no genuine disadvantages if you just look at them in a proper
perspective.
How Legal Change Occurs
If legal scholars - but I suppose the same goes for professionals in any other branche - should
be aware of anything, it should be the fact that experiences in the past have much to show us
as to the solving of present day problems. It would be very inefficient not to make use of
historical evidence in a specific field of expertise. This seems to be very much common sense,
but what you see in practice is that many times people prefer to reinvent the wheel. Now,
given the fact that we would like to establish a common private law in Europe, it is very
surprising to me that usually, no inspiration is drawn from the ius commune that once existed
in Europe in the 17th and 18th century and the coming about of that more or less uniform legal
system.
Even more surprising it is to find that when today there still is a commonality between
different legal systems in Europe, that this is not taken as a starting point for further research.
So what I would like to suggest, is that we do look at previous experiences concerning the ius
commune that once existed in Europe. And, moreover, that when there is already a common
feature of several legal systems, that we do look at the way this common feature has come into
being. Let me give you two examples of such common features that exist.
One common feature of many European private law systems, at least of the continental
ones, is - in property law - the existence of a numerus clausus of real rights. From the North
Cape to Palermo and from Porto to Odessa, rights in rem are part of a closed system: other
rights than the (essentially) seven that have been recognised in law, cannot be accepted. This
is, e.g., the case in France (art. 543 CC) in Belgium (idem), in Germany and in The Nether-
lands (art. 3:81 lid 1 BW and art. 584 BW (oud)).
Another common feature of a totally different character, now in the field of contract
law, is the existence of the very well known distinction between obligations de moyens and
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obligations de résultat. This distinction is, although criticized in these countries as well, more
or less accepted by the courts in France, in Belgium and in The Netherlands.
Now, here we have two examples of a common core. What should be interesting to
anyone, fascinated by European private law, is: how has this common core come into being?
Where does it come from? To know that, would be highly illuminating if you would like to
profit from previous experiences. The answer is rather simple: both the numerus clausus and
the distinction between two sorts of obligations have been accepted in one country (in the case
of the numerus clausus and the twofold obligations-distinction, in 17th century Germany and
20st century Belgium respectively) and after a certain time have been taken over in other
countries. In other words: one specific rule or argument was transplanted from one country to
another. This phenomenon of `legal transplants' has for legal history been explored thoroughly
by one of the most productive postwar legal historians, Alan Watson, who has stated that
`most changes in most systems are the result of borrowing'. Of course, the reason for this
borrowing was that a court, or a single judge, saw clearly the benefits of using an institution,
or a rule, or an argument, used in another country and there being rather succesful, and then
thinking it might serve the own legal system as well. It was thus not ratione imperii that the
law became common, but it was the other way around: reason itself decided when a specific
rule was considered to be so good that it could be transplanted into one's own legal system.
I will not dwell here upon the many, many historical examples of this pragmatic, not
to say practical, method of private law unification. I could point at the classic rules on
formation of contract (e.g. offer and acceptance), on the concept of `implied condition'
(condictio tacita, `stilzwijgende voorwaarde'), on rules like superficies solo cedit, on the
flexible content of servitudes, generally the same all over (continental) Europe. I could also
point at modern instruments of commercial law and finance, such as swaps, franchising and
sale and lease back that have been accepted in many countries with the leaving intact of more
or less common characteristics.
I will not dwell either on the tendency that before the 19th century, legal transplants
mainly took place within continental Europe, in mainly the 19th century they were extended to
the Anglo-American world as well (having for a consequence that, e.g., offer and acceptance
were introduced into the common law by Pollock and Maitland, who considered themselves
followers of Von Savigny) and that in the 20st century transplants have begun to flow mainly
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in the other direction, Europe deriving benefit from American law. Europeans having to admit
now that intellectual leadership in Western law is now with the United States. (But perhaps, if
the signs of times are understood in the right way, there may be a change of climate. In the
past few years, Western European private law has served much more as a source of inspiration
for the new Civil Codes of the former East-Block countries than American law).
What I do like to stress here, however, is the lesson that can be learned from this
historical survey. Without any doubt, it is a fascinating lesson: if most of the legal (private
law) change up till now has occurred through borrowing from other countries, what we should
do if we want to create a European private law, is to create a fruitful climate for these
transplants to take place. A ius commune could then emerge in a more or less natural way, in a
natural process of reception of law. The question, of course, is how to create such a fruitful
climate. It is that question to which I will turn now.
Competition of Legal Rules
The contribution the Law & Economics movement can make to the emergence of European
private law, is, in my opinion, large. If we - to use this very tempting terminology once more
- transplant Law & Economics thinking to the legal unification process, you might get an
argument like this: given the fact that similar legal problems arise all over the world (in the
words of Pomponius: what exactly is honeste vivere, when is there a case of alterum laedere,
what exactly is to be attributed suum cuique?), would it then not be a good idea to have the
legal rules, concerning these problems, compete with each other? If you would allow that to
happen, a `market' of legal rules would emerge. On this market of `legal culture', where rule
suppliers (the different legal systems) seek to satisfy demand, ultimately, the most efficient
rule will prove to be the winner. It is this rule that will in the end emerge as the best rule of
European legal systems. Would we be prepared to accept this argument, it would most of all
force us to accept a new and ambitious legal mentalité. This mentality would have an internati-
onal ambit; if accepted, it would change the outlook of private law in Europe totally. It would
mean that national courts would not only have themselves inspired by national law, but also by
other legal systems. It would mean that the Dutch Hoge Raad would not only refer to its own
decisions but also to those of the French Cour de Cassation, to those of the German Bundesge-
richtshof and to those of the English House of Lords. It would also mean that in a case of tort
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law not only Asser-Hartkamp III would be a source of inspiration, but also Winfield &
Jolowicz on Tort, Ghestin-Viney's La Responsabilité and Cornelis' Beginselen van het
Belgische buitencontractuele aansprakelijkheidsrecht.
Of course, the correct choice between the rules of the different legal systems can as a
matter of principle only be made if there is knowledge of every available rule. If this knowled-
ge does not exist, it will after all not be possible for the most efficient rule to come out on top.
So, the more attached to its own national solutions the legal system is, the less efficient it
should be considered to be. And the more a legal system has (or its - to quote Max Weber -
`Rechtshonoratioren' have) an internationalist mentalité, the more efficient it is.
The result of accepting this analysis and future method of obtaining a European private
law would be, in one word: unification. If the legal marketplace functions well, one rule will
eventually be singled out by the `buyers' as the best. We may not be aware of this, but the
fact that in the majority of European countries private law is now already more or less
uniform, is the very result of this process. The former ius commune, which those adhering to a
European private law so eagerly like to refer to, originated in more or less the same way,
rather than by having been mandatorily imposed by a centralist national authority. I admit: it
may be the case that, historically, more influences account for the unification process than just
choosing between various rules by the `Rechtshonoratioren', but for the future, this method
should be the prevailing one for various reasons I will come back to later.
So, I propose to you this afternoon: a method, theoretically embedded very firmly in
Law & Economics theory, for which we have historically very convincing evidence and that is
practically very easy to implement. All that we need, is a change of mentality in Europe: we
need to have practitioners, e.g. courts, lawyers, business people who are willing to give up
their adherence to their national laws and to look at solutions, arguments, rules from other
countries as well. Of course, this mentality change may need some time as well, but it is
possible. I like to use here the metaphor of free movement of legal rules because that is
exactly what it is: let the rules freely cross national borders and European legal paradise will
be there. And eventually, a mixed legal system will emerge. It will be mixed for it will have
aspects of various continental legal systems, but also of the civil law and the common law. It
has been done before: the South-African and Scottish experience show us the - very tempting -
way. Of course so tempting because most legal scholars agree that both South-Africa and
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Scotland have a legal system of `peculiar excellence' (Osborne), one `of genius' because it is
the product of a long process of `critical picking and choosing, simplifying, adapting and
rationalising' from the great legal traditions of Western civilisation (Lord Cooper of Culross).
There, at least in South-African law, courts are, and sometimes all in the same case, referring
to Larenz, Viney, Kötz, Grotius, Gaius and Birks.
I will not say much further about the specific approach within the Law & Economics
movement that the method of competition of legal rules fits in most. I should add that the
theoretical underpinning of a legal transplants-approach is of course very important, but mainly
an aspect of the theory to be discussed by Law & Economics scholars and not by me. I think I
can confine myself to the very broad acceptance of the general idea. And the general idea says
that a practice that is willing to accept the internationalist mentalité I propose, will reach the
desired results. In that sense, the proposed theory is rather practical.
The Benefits of the Approach of Competition of Legal Rules
Up till now, I have only been talking about the approach of competition of legal rules as a
possible way towards a new ius commune. I did not yet make clear why this method should be
considered to be the better one, compared to the many other suggested roads towards a
European private law. To give you an idea of those roads: legal scholars have suggested that a
ius commune could be reached, e.g., through the drafting of treaties, through legal science
itself, through legal education, by enacting a European Civil Code, by making soft law as a
model (as is done for contract law in the case of the Lando and Unidroit Principles) and -
within the framework of the European Union - by making more Directives than is done at
present, by making regulations (at least in the field of contract law) and by giving a larger role
to the European Court of Justice or even to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg
(that might be able to influence national legal systems much more than it does now, also in the
field of property law).
Allow me to embark upon the venture of showing why the method of competition of
legal rules is the most apt one to create a ius commune in Europe. At least three different
reasons in favour of this method could be given.
In the first place, by having free competition of legal rules, unification happens in
practice itself. Practitioners (or, for that matter, Rechtshonoratioren) themselves decide to
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what extent they are willing to borrow from another legal system. Thus, it is not an authorita-
tively imposed text (as would be the case with the enactment of a European Civil Code or even
by having Regulations or Directives), which carries in it the risk of failure, since a text alone
does not produce uniform law. In particular Pierre Legrand has emphasised the many risks of
`just' enacting a Code. Assuming that this is legally possible within the European Union (after
all `just' a matter of political will within the Union), the effect will most definitely not be
convergence of legal systems because there is more to law than only texts. In particular the
great divide between common law and civil law cannot be bridged by having a uniform text, as
even the very existence of a codification is so contrary to the character of English law that it
will not be acccepted there. This very real problem can be solved by leaving the unification
process to practice itself: then it is left to the national legal Gesellschaft to decide which
foreign rule may be transplanted, taking into account the legal culture of the importing
country. In this way, you get the best of two worlds: the inherently superior rule of one
(exporting) European legal system and no infringement of legal culture in the importing legal
system. In this way, tribute is paid to both the civil law and the common law mentalité.
This is not to say that legal science has no role to play in the proposed method of
competition of legal rules. (To suggest otherwise would be stupid because it would make most
of us present here unemployed.) Legal science should play the role that it to a certain extent
already has. It should try to compare the different private law rules in Europe and come up
with suggestions for common rules. Thus, it helps to create a marketplace of legal rules. It
should however not be concerned with the making of a European Civil Code itself. That would
be a task for politicians who do not grasp the signs of time and who do not understand that to
adhere to a European Civil Code is - to quote Pierre Legrand once more - a view straight from
the `Napoleonic era, a legacy of the simplified and mechanistic world view entertained by
positivists'.
In the second place, a benefit of having legal rules compete with each other, is that
uniform law will only come about in those areas of private law where it is really needed. The
European Parliament has called for the enactment of a European Civil Code in so far as
required by the Internal Market. I agree for the latter part of this call: we only need uniform
law for a rather limited area of private law. To quote Kötz: `Warum aber in aller Welt (...)
muss denn eine Ehe unter Sizilianern nach den gleichen Regeln geschlossen oder geschieden
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werden wie eine Ehe unter Dänen oder Iren?' Through reception of law, uniform law will only
come about where this is really needed, mainly in the field of contract law and security rights.
To have an entire Civil Code would entail the risk of failure, perhaps in these specific fields
because of the then centralistic imposure of `uniform' law upon member-states, but most
certainly in other fields of law, where unification is not needed at all.
In the third place, the method of unification by mixing legal systems has the inherent
advantage that change within the legal system is not difficult to accommodate. In codified law,
legal change demands as a matter of principle statutory intervention. There is however no need
for the authorities to do anything if you have free competition of legal rules. Would you use
private law to implement pure economic goals (as seems to be the case with the in a very
classical way designed Lando Principles), you could borrow as much arguments from other
legal systems in favour of these goals as would be the case if you would like to implement
goals, related to a more social policy. Arguments in favour of will theory and protection of
weaker parties are after all both present in proto-European ius commune. This means that if
you want to adjust (parts of) your private law system to another political goal than you did in
the past (e.g. influenced by the famous Zeitgeist), all you have to do is to have yourself
inspired by other rules than you were inspired by before. Thus, unification will be an ever
ongoing process; one cannot say it will ever come to a stand-still since the goals we want to
attain with the law change constantly. Unification then is much more an ideal to be attained
than a reality to be implemented.
What I do admit, is that we cannot have the perfect market-situation in making
European private law. At least one correction to the market should be made: where the
interests of weaker parties (mainly consumers) are endangered, State intervention is possible.
The instrument of European Union Directives seems to be the best method to establish this
protectionist mechanism.
The Fallacies and Limitations of the Approach of Competition of Legal Rules
As you can all imagine, I am not the one person from whom it can be expected to criticize the
theory I just exposed you to. I have however been so lucky to have already provoked some
criticism on my ideas on creating a ius commune Europaeum. I am going to say something
about this criticism, but only in a very concise way and definitely not discussing all objections
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that are possible. I hope we will come back to that later.
What could be brought forward against the proposed method, is that it will take a very
long time for a uniform rule to evolve through the free movement of legal rules. The `natural
process' could take centuries. I doubt this is right.
First of all, I could point at the many examples of borrowing that have taken place in
the past and that have not taken so long. The `reception' of the concept of offer and acceptan-
ce and of will theory in English law in the 19th century did not take more than 50 years. The
`trust' is now in a process of being recognised in continental European law and I would not be
surprised if within 30 years or so, we would have a totally accepted legal institution in The
Netherlands very similar to the Anglo-American trust.
Secondly and more important: in my view, to say it will take a long time is a spurious
argument. The alternative would be the imposition of a uniform text which will not automati-
cally result in uniform law, but conversely will have an adverse effect because the market will
be distorted: those using the uniform text will be inclined not to consider possible other rules
and solutions. So there is no real choice to come to unification, or rather it is between either a
European Civil Code, creating only a semblance of uniformity, or for no Code at all, but then
you have a law, inevitably more or less slowly evolving from the free movement of legal
rules.
As a second argument against my theory could be brought forward that, by using
Comparative Law & Economics, I am - in a utilitarian way, it has been said - experimenting
with legal rules and in doing so also experimenting with people. The European Citizen, it is
asserted, will be the victim of courts that `ad random' choose for rules from all over Europe.
The same line of reasoning is practiced by those who assert that competition of legal rules
leads to legal uncertainty because you can never be sure which rules will be applied by the
courts. I would answer these critics by saying that it is definitely not ad random that the courts
make their choice for a specific rule. They have to do this, just as they are doing this now, in
a careful and skillful way. I must admit that I have used in the past the wording `trial and
error' for what the courts in my method have to do. That may indeed not be such a good
expression for what I meant to say. What courts should try to do, is to find the best of all
possible solutions and of course they should not be allowed to say: `Hey, let me try Finnish
law for a change and see how the parties and the legal community react and in case of error I
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will use Portugese law next time'. That would indeed be legally and morally wrong, but it is
not what I am saying. To the argument of legal certainty I hope to come back in the discussi-
on.
In the third place, one could criticize the theoretical embedding in Law & Economics
Theory. This has been done in an eloquent way by Olav Haazen and he has been criticized for
that by Holzhauer and Kerkmeester. What I consider to be important here is the criticism
concerning the hypothesis of having complete information. In the ideal situation, Comparative
Law & Economics could only lead to the emergence of the best rule if every single court (or
Rechtshonoratioren in general) within the European Union knew everything about the 15
different legal systems. That is - of course - a pure fiction. But the more knowledge the courts
have about foreign law, the bigger the possibility we are close to the best rule and not working
with second, third, etc. best rules.
Finally, one could raise the objection that in my method the lion's share of the
unification process is left to the courts and that these are left with a far too big responsibility.
Here, I disagree with Ugo Mattei who has evaded this problem by arguing that in the end,
after a period of free market competition of legal rules, unifying codification should take place
and a classical method of deciding cases can take place. I already said that this would lead to a
non-flexible system, thus destroying one of the advantages of the competition-method. I
already emphasised as well that I do not believe in this sort of centralistic unification, that
might not have the desired effect at all because it is so very much contrary to the common law
mentalité. So I do believe in unification through the courts, be it that it is to the European Law
Faculties to show the way to the various solutions in different European countries. This
process has really just begun and will - if the signs are understood correctly - take a tremen-
dous course in the years to come. The job to be done by the courts will then be much easier
than it appears to be now.
As I do not accept these objections to be very real, I do however submit that there are
limitations to the method of competition of legal rules. The most important limitation is that
European private law can only come about if an internationalist mentalité in Europe does
emerge. Without the idea, held in legal practice all across the European Union, that it is useful
to look at foreign law, we will come to nothing. This is what Alan Watson has called the
element of `pressure force', one of the 9 decisive factors he distinguished as determining legal
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change: the power to change the law is dependent upon a recognizable group of persons who
believe that a benefit results from a practicable change in the law. If this group is not available
(and that may very well be the case, e.g. in France and in Spain), nothing happens. But then
again: would `uniform' law be imposed by a centralistic authority in these countries, the
impact would probably even be counterproductive, disturbing the national legal system.
To sum up: convergence of legal systems is not a political nor a scholarly venture. It
is a practical thing. So if we want to have a truly unified private law in Europe and are aware
of the limitations unification inherently has, I think the best method would be to have legal
rules compete. The ius commune Europaeum would emerge where it is needed the most: in
legal practice itself.
